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Towards a Justification the Principle of Coordination 
 
 
 
Maarten C.W. Janssen 
(Erasmus University Rotterdam) 
 
 
 
Abstract. Different variations of a Principle of Coordination are used in a 
number of different research traditions. Roughly speaking, one version of the 
Principle says that if there is a unique Pareto-efficient outcome in a game, 
then players will choose their part of that outcome. In this paper I will 
investigate the foundations of the Principle and see to what extent the 
Principle follows from some axioms regarding rational individual decision-
making. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I thank Michael Bacharach and Hans-Jorgen Jacobson for discussion.  
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1. Introduction 
 
On many occasions, individuals are able to coordinate their actions. Empirical evidence to 
this effect has first been gathered by Schelling (1960) in an informal experiment. His 
results were corroborated many years later by Mehta et al. (1994a,b) and Bacharach and 
Bernasconi (1997). From the point of view of mainstream game theory, the success of 
individuals in coordinating their actions is somewhat of a mistery. If there are two or more 
strict Nash equilibria, mainstream game theory has no means to explain why people tend to 
choose their part of one and the same equilibrium. Textbooks (see, e.g., Rasmusen, 1989, 
Kreps, 1990) refer to the fact that players may use focal points, a term introduced by 
Schelling (1960), but the notion of focal points cannot itself easily be incorporated into the 
theoretical framework. 
Since Gauthier (1975) many authors have attempted to explain the empirical facts in 
a way that departs in one way or the other from mainstream game theory. Crawford and 
Haller (1990) try to explain how rational individuals can use past play to learn to 
coordinate. Bacharach (1993), Sugden (1995) and Janssen (2000) try to explain how 
individuals can use the labels of strategies to coordinate their actions.1 All these papers use 
variations of the Principle of Coordination, a term introduced by Gauthier (1975). Gauthier 
(1975: 201) defines the Principle in the following terms: “in a situation with one and only 
one outcome which is both optimal and a best equilibrium, if each person takes every 
person to be rational and to share a common coneption of the situation, it is rational for 
each person to perform that action which has the best equilibrium as one of the possible 
outcomes”. Crawford and Haller (1990: 580) “maintain the working hypothesis that players 
play an optimal … strategy combination”, which is defined as a strategy combination that 
maximizes both players’ repeated-game pay-offs.2  Similarly, the technical notion 
Bacharach (1993: 266) employs has players choosing an equilibrium strategy combination 
that is not strictly pay-off dominated by another equilibrium strategy combination. Finally, 
Janssen (2000) terms it the Principle of Individual Team Member Rationality, which 
basically says that if there is a unique Pareto-efficient outcome, then rational players will 
choose their part of it. The main difference between the alternative uses of the Principle of 
                                                          
1 An overview of this literature is given in Janssen (1998a). 
2 The paper restricts attention to attainable strategies. As this concept is not important for my purposes, I have 
have not mentioned it in the definition introduced in the main text. 
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Coordination is whether or not it applies only when a game has a unique Pareto-efficient 
outcome. Crawford and Haller (1990) and Bacharach (1993) interpret the Principle as 
saying that players can coordinate on one of the Pareto-undominated Nash equilibia. 
Gauthier (1975) and Janssen (2000), on the other hand, use the Principle more narrowly as 
appying only to games with a unique Pareto-efficient outcome. 
The Principle of Coordination is not uncontroversial. It has been criticized by 
Gilbert (1989), among others. The purpose of this article is not to take away all 
controversy. The purpose is rather to clarify the discussion by showing that one version of 
the Principle follows from some axioms about considerations individual players have when 
choosing their actions. The discussion about the use of the Principle can then proceed by 
arguing whether or not these axioms are intuitively appealing and whether or not we should 
abandon the variations of the Principle that cannot be derived from these axioms. Our 
analysis provides support for the Principle of Coordination only in so far as there is a 
unique strict Pareto-efficient outcome and the basic idea of the rationalization is that 
individual players form a plan specifying for each player how to play the game and which 
conjecture to hold about their opponent’s play. The axioms that are postulated are at the 
level of these individual plans. We show that these axioms are such that if there is a unique 
strict Pareto-efficient outcome, there is a unique plan how to play the game. As the plan is 
unique, both players thinking individually will play according to the same plan and the 
Pareto-efficient outcome results. 
One approach to arguing in favour of the Principle is based on the idea that when 
playing a (coordination) game individuals should regard themselves as members of a team. 
Team thinking by individual players has recently been explored by many authors, including 
Sugden (1991) and Hollis (1998), but a more formal analysis of the concept has not yet 
been given. Sugden (1991: 776) suggests that the notion of team rationality could be 
developed in the tradition of regarding game theoretic solution concepts as being written 
down in a “book of recommendations for playing games which is entirely authorative”, the 
recommendation being addressed to both players (rather than to the individual player). The 
approach I take in this paper can be considered in this light, with the important difference 
that in many actual coordination problems there is no book of recommendations players can 
consult. Rather, individual players themselves have to think of a set of recommendations to 
both players. If there is a unique reasonable recommendation to make, the individual 
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reasoning process of players will result in the same recommendation and players 
coordinate. 
The formal approach that I take in this paper is based on an approach advocated by 
Jacobson (1996) in this journal. Jacobson (1996) investigates an alternative eductive 
foundation for the notion of Nash equilibrium. He argues that individual players should 
make a plan how to play a game. An individual plan specifies for each player a set of pure 
strategies and a set of conjectures about the opponents’ play. The formulation of a plan 
incorporates the game theoretic idea that each player not only thinks about what he himself 
is going to play, but also imagines himself in the position of his opponent. Jacobson 
formulates two requirements a plan has to fulfill. First, a plan has to be rational in the 
sense that given the conjectures the plan should specify an optimal response for each 
player. Second, a plan has to be internally consistent in the sense that a player must not 
expect the opponent to play a strategy that he himself, according to the same plan, will not 
play were he in the position of the opponent. The main result of the paper is that if a game 
has a unique Nash equilibrium, then players will play their Nash equilibrium strategies. 
Hence, the paper provides an alternative eductive justification for the notion of Nash 
equilibrium. 
In the present note I build on Jacobson by adding one requirement on the set of 
reasonable plans. I require that a plan be optimal in the sense that a player should only 
consider a particular plan if there does not exist another plan that is strictly better for both 
players. I show that the uniqueness version of the Principle of Coordination follows from 
the three requirements taken together. Hence, the paper can be considered as providing a 
justification for it.3 
 The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 present the main axioms. Section 3 
gives a formal statement of the result and Section 4 concludes with a discussion. 
                                                          
3 Another justification has recently been given by Colman and Bacharach (1997). They use a Stackelberg 
heuristic which is defined as a way in which the players can conceive the game as being played sequentially 
(whereas it is played simultaneously). A critique that can be levied against their approach is that coordination 
games are really simultaneous move games and we know, from the standard game theoretic literature, that 
simultaneous move games are rather different from sequential games. Hence, it may be difficult to explain 
why players conceive of the game in sequential terms. 
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2. Game Structure and Axioms of Play 
 
The analysis that follows is build around the following two player game. There is a Row 
player and a Column player. Each of the two players has a finite strategy space, denoted by 
RS , respectively CS , where RS ={1,..,m} and CS ={1,..,n}. The pay-off to player i, i=R,C 
is given by ),( crπ , where RSr∈  and CSc∈ . The structure of the game, including the 
pay-offs is common knowledge. 
In this section I introduce the four axioms on which the analysis is built. The first 
three axioms are taken from Jacobson (1996); the fourth axiom is new. The first axiom 
formulates the idea that a player plans what to do in his own position, but he also imagines 
himself in the position of the opponent. A plan specifies for each player a set of pure 
strategies that are motivated by the plan and a conjecture what the other player will choose. 
 
 A1. A player proceeds by formulating a plan P  with the structure 
),,;,( pCqRP = ,, CCR qSCSR ∆∈⊆⊆  and Rp ∆∈ , where R  and C  are 
the sets4 of pure strategies motivated by P  for the Row and Column player, 
respectively, while q  and p  are the conjectures (on the opponent in the other 
position). 
 
Not every plan is a reasonable plan. First, it seems reasonable to require that a plan be such 
that the sets of strategies that are motivated by the plan must be best responses to the 
conjectures that are held about the other player’s play. To this end, let us define by )( pBC  
and )(qBC  the set of pure strategies that are a best response to p, respectively q. A2 now 
formulates the first condition on reasonable plans. 
 
 A2. (Rationality). For a plan ),;,(: pCqRP =  of a player, it must be for each 
position that pure strategies motivated as playable by P  for that position are 
best replies to the conjecture held about the opponent in the other position, i.e., 
),(qBR R⊆  and )( pBC C⊆ . 
 
                                                          
4 Note that the set of pure strategies R and C that are motivated by a plan need not be singletons. 
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The third axiom that Jacobson (1996: 77) introduces says that for a plan to be reasonable, 
“the player holding it must not, according to that plan, expect his opponent to play a 
strategy that the player himself, according to the same plan, would not possibly play were 
he in the opponent's position”. 
 
 A3. (Internal Consistency). A plan ),;,(: pCqRP =  of a player must be such 
that if, according to P , there is strictly positive probability that the opponent 
in some position will play some pure strategy, then the player holding P must, 
according to P, himself be ready to play that strategy, were he in the 
opponent's position, that is, supp .supp and , RpCq ⊆⊆  
 
Accordingly, a plan of a player is such that the players do not consider the possibility that 
the other player uses a different plan. Note, once again, that this axiom does not impose a 
cross-player restriction. The axiom is internal to an individual player’s plan and does not 
require players to look into each other’s head. Jacobson motivates the axiom by saying that 
each player attributes his own kind of “rationality” to his opponent.  
Jacobson (1996: 81, proposition 2) shows that if a plan P=(R,q;C,p) satisfies A2 
and A3, then (p,q) is a Nash equilibrium of the game. Hence, we can define the (expected) 
pay-offs a plan P gives to the player i as the (expected) pay-off ),( qpiπ a player receives in 
the corresponding Nash equilibrium of the game. Plans that satisfy axioms A2 and A3, I 
will call internally consistent plans. 
Following the same logic, it seems reasonable to require that players only consider a 
plan to be reasonable if there does not exist another plan that gives both players a strictly 
larger pay-off.5 This is the content of A4. 
 
A4. (Optimality). A player’s plan P=(R,q;C,p) must be such that there does not 
exist another plan P’=(R’,q’;C’,p’) such that ),()','( qpqp ii ππ > for i=1,2. 
 
Note (again) that A4 is completely internal to the planning process of an individual. It, for 
example, does not involve knowledge of the expectations the player holds. The reason A4 
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is a reasonable axiom to impose is precisely because a plan is internal to the thought 
process of an individual player. Recall that an individual plan is built around the idea that 
an individual player imagines himself in his own and in the position of the opponent. It 
specifies the pure strategies he would consider playing in both positions and the conjectures 
about the other’s behavior he would hold in both positions. The plan can be considered a 
recommendation a player may give to both players. A player wants to give the best possible 
recommendation, i.e., a recommendation that is feasible (satisfies the axioms of rationality 
and internal consistency) and that gives the highest pay-off to both players. In this way, a 
player compares two feasible plans P and P’. If P’ would give him in both positions a lower 
pay-off than P, he would prefer P to P’. Attributing the same kind of rationality to his 
opponent, he is sure that she also prefers P to P’. 
 
 
3. Results 
 
In this section I briefly point at the main implications of requiring a reasonable plan to 
fulfill A1-A4. Before I do so, some terminology is introduced. I will call an outcome strict 
Pareto-efficient if the pay-off to each of the players in this outcome is strictly larger than 
the pay-off to each of them in any other outcome. The set of efficient Nash equilibria is 
defined as the Nash equilibria that are not Pareto-dominated by another Nash equilibrium.  
 Proposition 1 below states a relation between the set of efficient Nash equilibria and 
the set of conjectures supported by axioms A1-A4. It justifies the use of strategies that are 
part of a Nash equilibrium that itself is a member of the set of efficient Nash equilibria. 
Note that the justification is at the level of individual plans, rather than at the level of Nash 
equilibria.  
 
Proposition 1. 
(i) If (p,q) is a member of the set of efficient Nash equilibria, and if we define 
),(qBR R=  and )( pBC C= , then the plan P=(R,q;C,p) satisfies A2-A4. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
5 Here, I take a conservative view on optimality. If one wishes, one could defend a stronger criterion, namely 
that a plan is reasonable if there does not exist another internally consistent plan such that both players receive 
a pay-off that is at least as large and at least one player gets a strictly larger pay-off. 
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(ii) If the plan P=(R,q;C,p) satisfies A2-A4, then (p,q) is a member of the set of 
efficient Nash equilibria.  
 
The proof is omitted . Most of the proof follows immediately from Propositions 1 and 2 in 
Jacobson (1996: 81). The only thing that is new here relates to the efficiency aspects, but 
they easily follow from the definitions that are given. 
Note that Proposition 1 does not guarantee that an equilibrium results. The 
proposition only provides a justification for the use of strategies that are part of one of the 
efficient Nash equilibria. If the set contains more than one member, then it may very well 
be that one player’s plan corresponds to one equilibrium of this class and the other player’s 
plan corresponds to another equilibrium. Hence, an equilibrium may not result. This point 
is further discussed in Section 4 below.  
The main result is then stated in the proposition below. It provides a possible 
justification for the uniqueness version of the Principle of Coordination. 
 
Proposition 2.6  
(i) If there exists a unique strict Pareto-efficient outcome, then there exists a unique 
plan satisfying A2-A4 and players will coordinate on the Pareto-efficient outcome.  
(ii) If there exists a unique plan satisfying A2-A4, then players coordinate on the 
Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium. 
 
Proof. (i) If there exists a unique strict Pareto-efficient outcome, then there are p and q 
such that for all p’ and q’, )','(),( qpqp ii ππ > for i=1,2. Hence, ),( qp  must be a Nash 
equilibrium and, more, it is the unique element of the set of efficient Nash equilibria. From 
proposition 1(i) it then follows that there exists a (unique) plan that satisfies A2-A4. 
 (ii) Suppose there exists a unique plan satisfying A2-A4. This implies that there 
exists one plan P=(R,q;C,p) such that for all and p’ and q’ that are part of a plan 
P’=(R’,q’;C’,p’) that satisfies A2 and A3, )','(),( qpqp ii ππ > for i=1,2. Hence, both 
players choose the same plan and from proposition 1(ii) we know that a Nash equilibrium 
results.  Moreover, it must be a Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium.   // 
                                                          
6 If a stronger  version of the optimality axiom A4 is used, then we can asserts a stronger version of this 
Proposition. In particular, we may then srop the “strictness” requirement in part (i). 
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Note that proposition 2 does not tell us that Axioms A1-A4 guarantee that a Pareto-efficient 
outcome results. When there are multiple Pareto-efficient outcomes, none of them may be 
supported as a Nash equilibrium. Hence, the second part of proposition 2 does not 
guarantee that a Pareto-efficient outcome results if players’ plans satisfy A1-A4. (See the 
discussion below on the Prisoner’s Dilemma). 
 
 
4. Discussion 
 
I realize that the Principle of Coordination is a controversial Principle. In this section I 
discuss some of the possible critiques along three topics: (i) coordination is assumed rather 
than explained, (ii) what is the relation with risk dominance? (iii) Does the Principle imply 
cooperative behavior in the one shot Prisoner’s Dilemma? The purpose of the discussion is 
to make the argument that is made more transparent by arguing what is entailed, and 
especially, what is not implied. Before discussing the possible objections, I want to argue 
that the optimality requirement that I introduce below fits the framework of Jacobson 
(1996) quite nicely.  
Jacobson (p. 68) formulates the problem of providing a foundation for the notion of 
Nash equilibrium in the following terms: 
 
In a non-cooperative game each player must make up his mind on what to play 
and expect others to play on a purely individual basis. On the other hand, a 
Nash equilibrium is by definition something collective, a collection of 
strategies with a specific cross player property. The problem of justifying the 
Nash equilibrium concept is the same as explaining how purely individual 
considerations may lead each player to do his part of such a collective plan. 
 
He continues to argue that it is in the spirit of traditional game theoretic reasoning that 
players consider themselves in their own position and in the position of their opponents. 
Each individual player formulates a plan consisting of conjectures and actual strategies for 
all players. The two requirements formulated loosely above are considered to be 
assumptions that a reasonable plan has to fulfill.  
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 It is important to realize that even the weakest solution concepts that are employed 
in non-cooperative game theory, like iterative elimination of dominated strategies (IEDS) 
or rationalizability, have individual players impose restrictions on the likely behavior of 
others (cf., Bernheim, 1984, and Pearce, 1984). The common knowledge of rationality 
assumption on which IEDS is based assumes that all players conjecture (or even: know) 
other players to be as rational as they are. It is not entirely clear how to categorize this 
assumption. It is clear that the assumption imposes restrictions beyond the notion of 
rational individual behavior. However, it is possible to interpret the assumption as being 
completely internal, in the sense that the assumption only imposes restrictions on the 
thought processes of individual players (cf. Janssen, 1998b). Hence, one may defend the 
thesis that the considerations that lead to the notion of IEDS are purely individualistic. 
The two axioms Jacobson (1996) introduces (see A2 and A3 above) impose 
restrictions on the behavior expected by the other player that go beyond the restrictions the 
notion of rationalizability imposes. One way to see this is to present an example from 
Jacobson (1996: 84). In the game presented below in normal form there is a unique Nash 
equilibrium and it is in mixed strategies, namely the Row player chooses u with probability 
1/3 and c with probability 2/3 and the Column player chooses m with probability 1/3 and r 
with probability 2/3. Hence, the strategies that are justifiable according to the justification 
provided by  Jacobson are {u,c} and {m,r}. The set of rationalizable strategies is larger, 
however, and contains all three pure strategies for both players. 
 
  l m r 
 U 0,4 0,2 1,0 
 C 1,0 2,3 0,4 
 R 5,0 0,1 0,0 
 
 Figure 1. Not all rationalizable strategies are reasonable strategies 
 
The restriction on the strategies that are justifiable comes from requiring that a plan be 
internally consistent. A player views his opponent to be like himself in the sense that a 
player must not expect the opponent to play a strategy that he himself, according to the 
same plan, will not play were he in the position of the opponent. In other words, a plan of a 
 11 
player does not allow the other player to consider a different plan. Again, one may wonder 
how to categorize this assumption. It was argued above that the assumption imposes 
restrictions beyond the notion of rational individual behavior and even beyond the notion of 
rationalizability. However, it is (again) possible to interpret the assumption as being purely 
individualistic, in the sense that the assumption only imposes restrictions on the individual 
thought processes when players are deliberating about which plan to adopt.7 
The requirement I impose in addition, namely that plans should be optimal, can be 
justified along the same lines. Each player formulates an individual plan. To be reasonable 
the plan has to fulfill three requirements (rationality, internal consistency and optimality). 
The optimality condition can be justified along the following grounds. A plan can be 
considered a recommendation to both players how to play the game. If I, as a player of the 
game, have to come up with a recommendation (plan) for both players (the team), then I 
should give the best recommendation, i.e., one that guarantees the best possible outcome 
for the team. This consideration, and the others, justifying the three requirements together 
only impose restrictions on the individual thought processes; not one of the players has to 
know something that goes on in someone else’s head. Hence, the requirements can be 
justified as being of a purely individualistic nature.  
 Below I will discuss the three possible objections to the Principle of Coordination. 
 
Coordination 
One possible objection to the Principle of Coordination is that it assumes a form of 
coordination instead of explaining it in terms of individual considerations. The above 
analysis is, at least partly, able to counter this criticism. To do this consider the game of pure 
coordination given below. 
 
  L R 
 L 1,1 0,0 
 R 0,0 1,1 
 
Figure 2: a game of pure coordination 
                                                          
7 Jacobson (1996: 78) compares his apporach to the one of Aumann and Brandenburger (1991) and he rightly 
observes that their approach cannot be justified in this way as players are required to know what is going on 
in the heads of other players. 
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Axioms A1-A4 do not guarantee in any way that players coordinate in the game of Figure 
2. One player’s plan may involve both players choosing L and conjecturing that the other 
will play L, whereas the second player’s plan may specify that both players choose R and 
conjecture that the other will play R. As this form of miscoordination is not excluded by 
A1-A4, I conclude that the Principle of Coordination that follows from A1-A4 does not 
assume coordination.8 
More generally, if there are multiple equilibria that cannot be Pareto-ranked then 
A1-A4 do not guarantee that players coordinate their actions on a Nash equilibrium. This is 
important as some authors have assumed that players can coordinate on one of the Pareto-
efficient equilibria in case of multiplicity. Bacharach (1993: 266), for example, assumes 
that players choose Pareto-undominated Nash equilibrium strategy combinations. A similar 
problem arises in the analysis of Crawford and Haller (1990: 575) who assume that players 
can maintain coordination in an infinitely repeated version of Figure 2 if they have 
coordinated once. As there are potentially many different ways in which players can 
maintain coordination and as each of these ways is equivalent in terms of pay-offs, our 
anaysis does not provide foundations for this assumption (cf. Goyal and Janssen, 1996). 
 
Risk Dominance 
A second possible objection to the Principle of Coordination may be that it does not hold 
when there is a conflict between Pareto-efficiency and risk dominance. An example is 
given in Figure 3. In that Figure there are two Nash equilibria in pure strategies: (T,L) is 
Pareto-efficient and (B,R) is risk dominant.9 
 
  L R 
 L 10,10 4,7 
 R 7,4 8,8 
 
Figure 3: A conflict between Pareto-efficiency and risk dominance 
 
                                                          
8 A similar conclusion follows when considering a game like the Battle of the Sexes. 
9 An equilibrium is risk dominant if both players’ best response remains unchanged as long as the opponent 
chooses the equilibrium strategy with a probability at least equal 0.5. 
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Recent literature in game theory has resulted in conditions under which players are 
expected to play the risk dominant rather than the Pareto-efficient equilibrium. Carlsson 
and Van Damme (1993) consider a framework in which players observe pay-offs with 
some noise and show that (under some conditions) the risk dominant equilibrium survives 
IEDS. Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993), among others, study a 
population of agents interacting in an evolutionary environment and they show that the risk 
dominant equilibrium is selected in the long run. 
 The circumstances I consider in this paper do not fit either one of these environ-
ments. This paper provides an eductive justification for the Principle of Coordination in 
case the game structure, including the pay-off, is common knowledge. The literature 
mentioned above considers other environments and I don’t want to argue that the Principle 
of Coordination should apply in each and every possible situation. Instead when there is 
enough information and knowledge about each other, players can consider themselves as a 
team and think individually what is best for the team and its members. This paper argues 
that in these conditions the Principle of Coordination may hold. 
 
Prisoner’s Dilemma 
A third issue concerning the Principle of Coordination is whether it enforces players to 
choose to cooperate in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. The direct response here is that it 
does not. In a PD game, there is only one internally consistent plan and that is to defect in 
both positions and to conjecture that the other will defect. Hence, A4 does not impose any 
further restrictions and cooperative behavior does not follow.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper has tried to clarify the Principle of Coordination by providing four axioms from 
which the Principle follows. By doing so, I have been able to tell what the Principle entails 
and what it does not, making the controversy around the Principle more transparent. For 
example, the Principle does not tell players in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game to cooperate. 
Also, it does not solve the Battle of the Sexes, nor coordination games where the Nash 
equilibria have identical pay-offs. In this way the paper discriminates between different 
versions of the Principle of Coordination. The axioms mentioned here only support a 
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“uniqueness” version of the Pinciple, which says that if there existss a unique Pareto-
efficient outcome in a game, then players will choose their part of that outcome.  
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